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Court-Annexed Arbitration:
The Wrong Cure
Diane P. Woodt
Civil litigation is in a state of crisis in the federal courts of the
United States.1 In district after district, the sheer volume of crimi-
nal cases pending on the docket, coupled with a relentlessly in-
creasing civil caseload, means that a civil litigant can expect
lengthy delays, often exceeding three years, before obtaining his or
her "day in court" at trial.2 The situation in many state courts ap-
t Harold J. and Marion F. Green Professor of International Legal Studies and Associ-
ate Dean, The University of Chicago. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Bernard
G. Sang Faculty Fund for this work. I also thank Dennis J. Hutchinson and Larry Kramer
for comments on earlier drafts, and Lewis H. Leicher for his able research assistance.
See, generally, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, Part I, 4-10 (Apr 2,
1990) ("Federal Courts Study Committee Report"); Brookings Task Force on Civil Justice
Reform, Justice for All: Reducing Costs and Delay in Civil Litigation 1 (Brookings Institu-
tion, 1989) ("Justice for All"); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoe-
nix?, 69 Minn L Rev 1 (1984); ABA Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay,
Attacking Litigation Costs and Delay (American Bar Association, 1984); A. Leo Levin and
Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 Rutgers L Rev 219 (1985). Some
writers strongly dispute the idea that there is anything out of the ordinary in the federal
court caseload, or certainly anything that deserves to be called a crisis. See, for example,
Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Bar-
riers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U Pa L Rev 1901, 1908-10 (1989).
2 For example, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that during the
12-month period ending June 30, 1989, 194,910 civil cases (exclusive of land condemnation,
prisoner petitions and deportation reviews) were filed nationwide. Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, Annual Report 212, Table C5 (1989) ("1989 Annual Report"). Of
those, 184,937 never completed a trial and were disposed of either with no court action
(58,405) or with court action (126,532). Id. Of the remaining 9,973 that went to trial, the
median time from filing to disposition was 18 months; ten percent of the cases took more
than 42 months. Id. In some districts, the numbers were notably worse: the District of Mas-
sachusetts-28 months (median), 63 months (top ten percent); Northern District of New
York-31 months (median), 53 months (top ten percent); Northern District of West Vir-
ginia-28 months (median), 57 months (top ten percent); Southern District of Texas-28
months (median), 60 months (top ten percent); Southern District of Indiana-30 months
(median), 51 months (top ten percent); Southern District of California-30 months (me-
dian), 68 months (top ten percent). Id at 212-14. See also Kenyon D. Bunch and Richard J.
Hardy, A Re-examination of Litigation Trends in the United States: Galanter Reconsid-
ered, 1986 Mo J of Dispute Resolution 87, 98, 100. But see Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L Rev 4 (1983). Galanter's arti-
cle, however, emphasized the question whether we somehow have "too much" litigation now,
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pears to be no better.' The dissonance between the ideal of civil
justice, in which disputing parties are entitled to submit their con-
troversy to a court and have the facts tested in an open trial before
a jury, and the reality, in which the costs of litigation and the scar-
city of judicial resources end up conferring trials on only five per-
cent of these parties, has reached alarming proportions.4
Not surprisingly, this crisis has provoked a* number of re-
sponses. For example, in November of 1988, Congress commis-
sioned the Federal Courts Study Committee to investigate the
problems facing the federal judiciary, with a broad-ranging agenda
that included the allocation of business between federal and state
courts, the use of specialized tribunals, procedural reforms, alter-
native methods of dispute resolution, internal management of the
courts, and various long range reforms. The Committee issued its
final report on April 2, 1990, proposing major changes in the struc-
not whether there is quantitatively more of it than we once had, and not whether the
amount is causing systemic problems.
I The National Center for State Courts does not report data on times between filing
and trial date in its annual report on state court caseload statistics. However, the 1986 re-
port shows a heavy caseload burden for the state courts as a whole. More than 15.7 million
new civil cases and 11 million new criminal cases were filed in the state trial courts in 1986.
See National Center for State Courts, State Court Caseload Statistics: 1986 Annual Report
5 ("1986 State Court Statistics"). Total civil filing trends in general jurisdiction courts
demonstrate that the majority of states experienced more than a three percent gain during
both the 1984-85 and 1985-86 periods. 1986 State Court Statistics at 25, Chart 1. Whether
this deserves to be called a "crisis" or just a difficult situation may be debatable. However, it
is indisputable that the states are also actively seeking solutions to the severe problems of
cost and delay that they perceive. For one response to the problem of delay in the state
courts, see National Conference of State Trial Judges, Court Delay Reduction Standards,
reprinted in ABA Lawyers Conference: Task Force on Reduction of Litigation Cost and
Delay, Defeating Delay: Developing and Implementing a Court Delay Reduction Program
167 (American Bar Association, 1986).
The precise percentage of cases reaching trial in the federal courts in 1989 is 5.12
percent. 1989 Annual Report at 212, Table C5 (9,973/194,910) (cited in note 2). The ideal
suggested in the text can be attributed solely to historical practice (such as the days before
what Judith Resnik calls "managerial judging"), or it may be read to suggest that adjudica-
tion is still a superior mechanism when it is available, and settlement must be regarded as a
necessary evil. See, generally, Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv L Rev 374 (1982);
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L J 1073 (1984). Compare Albert W. Alschuler,
Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargain-
ing System, 50 U Chi L Rev 931 (1983); and David J. Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Effi-
cient" Courts in a Democratic Society, 46 NYU L Rev 653 (1971), making the same general
point about criminal trials versus pre-trial methods of terminating cases. Nevertheless, it is
worth remembering that the problem of court congestion and delay is not a new one. See,
for example, Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz, Delay in the Courts
(Little, Brown & Co., 1959).
' Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub L No 100-702, § 102(b), 102
Stat 4642, 4644 (1988). See, generally, Federal Courts Study Committee Report (cited in
note 1).
[1990:
THE WRONG CURE
ture of the federal court system. 6 On January 25, 1990, Senator
Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, leading a bi-
partisan group in the Senate, introduced a bill entitled the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990.' This bill addresses directly the
problems of cost and delay in the civil justice system by requiring
each federal district to adopt a "civil justice expense and delay re-
duction plan."8 As it exists at present, the bill requires each plan
to include some system of differentiated case management, greater
control by "judicial officers," including both judges and magis-
trates, over scheduling and discovery, provision for use of alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanisms, and mechanisms for handling
any backlog of cases existing in the district. The Biden bill has
sparked a spirited debate between the federal judiciary, who gener-
ally have urged less "micro-management," and various groups from
the plaintiffs' and defense bar, public interest bar and client com-
munity, all of whom are searching for a way to go beyond "busi-
ness as usual.""
Notably, both the Federal Courts Study Committee and the
Brookings Task Force report, on which the Civil Justice Reform
bill was based, identify alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") as
one of the approaches that may alleviate the crisis in the civil jus-
tice system.10 Many others have also reached this conclusion." Al-
Federal Courts Study Committee Report (cited in note 1).
S 2027, 101 Cong, 2d Sess, introduced January 25, 1990, in 136 Cong Rec S414. See
also HR 3898, 101 Cong, 2d Sess, the companion bill in the House of Representatives, intro-
duced by Rep. Jack Brooks, January 25, 1990, in 136 Cong Rec E75.
S 2027, 136 Cong Rec at 421.
' See, for example, in opposition to the bill, the prepared statement of Hon. Aubrey E.
Robinson, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, on
behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States, before the Committee on the Judici-
ary, United States Senate, on S 2027, March 6, 1990 (on file with the author); Federal Bar
Association Resolution 90-4, opposing S 2027 as written (on file with the author); American
Bar Association Resolution opposing S 2027 as written (on file with the author). For state-
ments in favor of the bill, see, generally, Justice for All (cited in note 1); and the testimony
of Patrick Head (on behalf of the Business Roundtable), Gene Kimmelman (on behalf of the
Consumer Federation of America), Bill Wagner (on behalf of the American Trial Lawyers
Association), and Stephen B. Middlebrook (on behalf of the American Insurance Associa-
tion) at the Hearing on S 2027 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, March 6,
1990 (on file with the author).
o Federal Courts Study Committee Report at 24 (cited in note 1); Justice for All at 23
(cited in note 1).
" See, for example, Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of
Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 Harv L
Rev 1808, 1836-59 (1986); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 Harv L Rev 668 (1986); Wayne D. Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-
Sponsored ADR Programs: Why They Exist, How They Operate, What They Deliver, and
Whether They Threaten Important Values, 1990 U Chi Leg F 303; Deborah R. Hensler,
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though there seems to be little doubt that some form of ADR may
be useful in some cases, a more precise identification of when it is
appropriate and how it should be structured is still necessary. The
thesis of this Article is that the mandatory court-annexed arbitra-
tion programs that the federal courts (and many state courts) are
instituting are, in a sense, the wrong cure for what ails those
courts. This is not to argue that court-annexed arbitration is all
bad. It is only to say that it is probably not addressing the root
causes of the civil litigation logjam, and, furthermore, that it is in-
capable of doing so satisfactorily."
I. ADR AND CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Civil Courts: Outmoded or Overloaded?
To speak of "civil" litigation or civil courts is to recognize
some distinction between this branch of law and, on the other
hand, criminal and perhaps administrative law. Acknowledging the
imperfections inherent in any characterization, it is nonetheless
true that civil cases are different in some important ways from
criminal cases. For present purposes, there is some value in identi-
fying exactly what makes something a civil dispute, and in asking
why we wish to devote public resources to the resolution of that
dispute. With a clear idea of the value and purpose of civil litiga-
tion, it is possible to evaluate the contributions and detriments of
modern, innovative procedures, such as court-annexed arbitration,
to see if those procedures are accomplishing the desired purposes.
A civil dispute typically has several characteristics. First, the
dispute is generally confined to particular individuals or groups of
individuals. The community as a whole is far more interested in
Court-Ordered Arbitration: An Alternative View, 1990 U Chi Legal F 399. See, generally,
Stephen B. Goldberg, Eric D. Green and Frank E.A. Sander, Dispute Resolution (Little,
Brown & Co., 1985); Susan M. Leeson and Bryan M. Johnston, Ending It: Dispute Resolu-
tion in America 47-162 (Anderson Publishing Co., 1988); Frank E.A. Sander, "Varieties of
Dispute Processing," in Proceedings of the Pound Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 FRD 79, 111 (1976); Jessica Pearson,
An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 Just Sys J 420 (1982).
12 The basic conclusion of the Federal Courts Study Committee was similar. Part I of
its report graphically describes the crisis in which the federal courts find themselves, and
examines whether an increase in the number of judges would solve it. It accordingly pro-
poses a number of important structural reforms, including the abolition of most diversity
jurisdiction, the assignment of many drug cases to the state courts, an expanded exhaustion
requirement for state prisoner civil rights cases, increased use of specialized courts, creation
of a federal small claims system, and, in some ways, increased ADR. See Federal Courts
Study Committee Report at 13-26 (cited in note 1). There would have been no need to
modify so many parts of the system if ADR alone would have solved the problem.
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the manner of a dispute's resolution than in its outcome, that is, in
a peaceable rather than violent manner, and in a way that does not
create permanent rifts in the community itself. Second, putting the
possibility of violence to one side, the community is indifferent to
whether a civil dispute is resolved, to the terms on which it is re-
solved, and to the type of dispute resolution mechanism used. It is
enough that both sides accept the legitimacy of the solution and
any measures needed to enforce it effectively. Finally, a formal
civil dispute that may be entertained in the courts is somehow dis-
tinguishable from other interpersonal difficulties; that is, law must
exist that addresses (or may address) the problem. Law, of course,
is not static, and courts today entertain claims that would have
been thought outside the purview of law in earlier days, such as
cases about the length of a man's hair, broken social dates or negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress.
In spite of the basically private nature of civil disputes and
the wide berth of discretion that the parties enjoy in resolving
them, the need to appeal to law to resolve them necessarily impli-
cates public values. Once a case has passed the basic test of
whether legal rights or duties are implicated, the parties are no
longer the only ones with a stake in its resolution. Whatever the
source of the law-judge-made, statutory or constitutional-the
court's application of the law in the particular case will have an
effect on the law's own development. Thus the community as a
whole has a stake in the substantive outcome of the case. Further-
more, to the extent that the methods courts use in discharging
their dispute resolution function affect outcomes, the community
shares a stake in what those methods are. Ideally, those methods
should lead to accuracy in factfinding, to appropriate application
of the law, and to acceptance of the court's results, both by the
litigants and by the broader community.
Assuming still that civil courts exist for some useful purpose,
the question of who has access to those courts is important. To the
extent that less than the entire community has access to them, the
courts cannot assist in the peaceable resolution of some subset of
legal disputes, and the development of the law may become
skewed. The access question, in turn, is closely related to the cost
of civil litigation. If the costs to the litigant of invoking the aid of
the courts are prohibitively high, then the affected people are no
better off than if the state actually had abolished civil courts for
them.
The denial of access to the courts resulting from'high costs is a
matter of no moment (apart from questions of economic discrimi-
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nation) if civil courts have outlived their usefulness. In that case,
however, civil courts should be abolished for all civil disputes, not
just those brought by the impecunious. At first glance, it seems
that a case for wholesale abolition could be made. After all, most
eligible disputes do not end up in court, and of those that do, set-
tlement or summary disposition disposes of the overwhelming ma-
jority.'" If settlement or truncated procedures are good enough for
95 or 99 percent of civil disputes, what justifies retaining civil
courts? Individuals with breach of contract claims, tort claims or
disputes over property could simply turn to the private dispute
resolution market when the tensions of disagreement become
unbearable." '
What would be lacking in such a world? At the least, the abil-
ity to enforce the awards granted by private institutions against
recalcitrant parties would be lacking, unless some kind of public
institution entitled to exercise force and to take property (or to
force action) were available. In addition, some have argued that
the public adjudication of the "tip of the iceberg" civil cases cre-
ates a public good for litigants, in the form of information about
the content of the underlying social rules noted above.'" The re-
maining 95 percent of cases would not be so easily resolved if this
source of information dried up. Finally, to the extent that private
,litigation actually implicates fundamental legal rules, whether
,S Galanter, 31 UCLA L Rev at 27-28 (cited in note 2); David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat,
William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer and Joel B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary
Litigation, 31 UCLA L Rev 72, 89 (1983); George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selec-
tion of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984) (noting that only a very small
fraction of disputes come to trial). See also D. Marie Provine, Settlement Strategies for
Federal District Judges 7 (Federal Judicial Center, 1984), citing Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, Annual Report 284, Table C4 (1984) ("1984 Annual Report"),
showing that only five percent of cases filed in the federal district courts actually go to trial.
See note 2.
" The private market is active and growing. It includes such well-established institu-
tions as arbitration and mediation associations as well as more recent options such as the
"rent-a-judge" program popularized in California. See Endispute, Inc., Making Alternative
Dispute Resolution Work: A Guide for Practicing Lawyers, reprinted in Administrative
Conference of the United States, Sourcebook: Federal Agency Use of Alternative Means of
Dispute Resolution (1987) ("Federal Agency Sourcebook"); Robert Coulson, Business Arbi-
tration-What You Need To Know (American Arbitration Assoc., 1987). See, generally,
Richard L. Marcus and Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation: Cases and Materials on
Advanced Civil Procedure 815-36 (West Publishing Co., 1985).
"S See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods
of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U Chi L Rev 366, 388
(1986); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J
Legal Stud 235, 240 (1979) (noting the importance of precedent production); Steven Shavell,
The Social Versus the Private Incentives To Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J
Legal Stud 333 (1982).
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those are rules about the integrity of private property, rules about
nondiscrimination or rules about the regulation of markets,
lawmakers-either judges or legislators-would be unable to moni-
tor compliance with those rules and devise needed modifications if
all civil litigation were privatized.'
These considerations suggest that civil litigation today, far
from being outmoded, is more necessary than ever. More and more
laws of general applicability place important constraints on private
behavior. In addition, as noted above, private dispute resolution
mechanisms only change the shape and timing of civil litigation;
they do not eliminate the need for it altogether. Both the need for
statutes providing for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards, and the limitations on the enforceability of arbitral
awards, sharply illustrate this point.1"
If civil courts still have a role to play, then the pressures that
are driving litigants and disputes away from them require careful
examination. This kind of examination will help reveal under what
circumstances ADR, and especially court-annexed arbitration,
most appropriately substitutes for the civil suit in court, and under
what circumstances it is doing so only because the courts are so
overcrowded that the litigants have no other practical alternative.1 8
See, generally, John V. O'Hara, The New Jersey Alternative Procedure for Dispute
Resolution Act: Vanguard of a "Better Way'?, 136 U Pa L Rev 1723, 1743-51 (1988). The
problem of monitoring compliance with legal rules has received attention from the media in
the related area of confidential or sealed settlements. In 1988, the Washington Post ran a
four-part series of articles entitled "Public Courts, Private Justice" that examined the ef-
fects of secrecy in civil lawsuits. See Elsa Walsh and Benjamin Weiser, Court Secrecy
Masks Safety Issues; Key GM Fuel Tank Memos Kept Hidden in Auto Crash Suits, Wash-
ington Post Al (Oct 23, 1988); Elsa Walsh and Benjamin Weiser, Hundreds of Cases
Shrouded in Secret; Area Suits Often Sealed With Few Queries, Washington Post Al (Oct
24, 1988); Benjamin Weiser and Elsa Walsh, Drug Firm's Strategy: Avoid Trial, Ask Se-
crecy; Records Reveal Story of Zomax Recall, Washington Post Al (Oct 25, 1988); Benjamin
Weiser and Elsa Walsh, Secret Filing, Settlement Hide Surgeon's Record; Questions Raised
Over Patients' Deaths, Washington Post Al (Oct 26, 1988). See also Philip H. Corboy,
Masked and Muzzled, Litigants Tell No Evil: Is This Blind Justice?, Legal Times 27 (Jan
8, 1990). The problem is the same in sealed settlements as it is in court-annexed arbitration:
the public does not learn what facts give rise to legal claims and under what circumstances,
even though the parties obtain a private ruling on their particular case.
" See, for example, the Federal Arbitration Act, codified at 9 USC §§ 1-15 (1988). The
limitations on enforceability include cases in which the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
and those in which the award was procured by fraud or undue means. 9 USC § 10 (1988).
"8 A similar call for a better understanding of ADR appears in Jethro K. Lieberman
and James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U Chi
L Rev 424, 438 (1986). This need for a better understanding is especially pressing if, as
Deborah Hensler argues in her article in this issue, urban litigants frequently find them-
selves excluded from conventional adjudication. Hensler, 1990 U Chi Legal F at 408 (cited
in note 11).
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B. A Taxonomy of Civil Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Although others have suggested ways of classifying methods of
dispute resolution," it is helpful here to offer a slightly different
taxonomy. This exercise both locates court-annexed arbitration in
the broader landscape of court and alternative procedures, and be-
gins to suggest the criteria against which court-annexed arbitration
should be assessed.
In a small percentage of cases, the disputants regard the
courts as an essential resource, and they persevere to the bitter
end, participating in trials and sometimes even appealing their
cases to higher courts. This group represents "traditional court liti-
gation." Until relatively recently, ADR techniques were absent
from such cases.20 Court procedures continue to serve as the yard-
stick against which other systems are measured, and therefore
these cases, while not requiring discussion here, deserve mention.
In a related group of cases, disputants formally commence a suit in
court, not with the expectation that they will actually have a trial,
but instead with the expectation that the case will terminate with
a consensual settlement. These are the "settlement-oriented court
cases." In a third class of cases, the parties freely choose in ad-
vance of any dispute to resolve their differences using a more or
less formal "alternative" method of dispute resolution, such as ar-
bitration or mediation, without involving the courts at all. These
cases employ "voluntary" or "independent" ADR. Finally, and
most recently, a group of cases has arisen in which the disputants
file their suit in court expecting full adjudication, but the court
diverts the case onto a "mandatory settlement" or "non-trial" ad-
judicatory track. Normally in these cases, those who are deter-
mined to reach their ultimate day in court may do so, but only
after the delay and expense caused by mandatory participation in
the court-sponsored ADR procedures.
" Typical ways of organizing the subject appear in Goldberg, Green & Sander, Dispute
Resolution (cited in note 11), and Leeson & Johnston, Ending It (cited in note 11). See also
Provine, Settlement Strategies (cited in note 13) for a discussion of a variety of tools fed-
eral district judges may use to promote settlement.
" The addition of new mandatory ADR procedures to traditional litigation, among
which one finds the court-annexed arbitration procedures that are the subject of this article,
has changed court adjudication significantly. In addition, the remedies that have been
adopted in some complex cases have sometimes employed non-judicial personnel. The As-
bestos Claims Settlement Facility, described in Marcus & Sherman, Complex Litigation at
834-36 (cited in note 14), is one example. See also Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Func-
tional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U Chi L Rev 440 (1986).
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The second and third categories-settlement-oriented court
cases and independent ADR--are fundamentally similar, differing
only in whether the agreement to resolve a case privately occurs
after the suit is filed or before it arises. Both categories have ex-
isted for centuries. Guilds operated arbitration services, organized
markets used a form of arbitration and mediation existed in all
forms of society.2 Although the common law courts were hostile to
suits to compel enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate future
disputes until the early twentieth century, it appears that they
willingly enforced final arbitral awards.22 Professor Leo Kanowitz
suggests that courts' unwillingness to enforce executory agreements
to arbitrate may have represented an effort to avoid allowing set-
tlement or ADR to "prevent judges from performing their duty to
interpret and implement the values embodied in constitutions,
statutes, and other authoritative texts."2
My explanation is somewhat simpler. The common law courts
apparently wanted unfettered consent to the non-judicial dispute
resolution process. A person could opt out of an arbitral procedure
at any time prior to its commencement, even if he or she had
agreed to use it at an earlier point in time. If objections to the
avoidance of courts arose only after the winner and loser were
named, however, the courts generally gave them little weight.
The much-trumpeted change in the courts' current attitude
toward arbitration therefore appears to be a shift in the concept of
consent. Rather than thinking there is something magical about
consenting to the forum at the time a dispute arises, courts have
come to consider an executory agreement regarding arbitration to
be just as valid as an agreement on any other subject matter.24
21 John R. Allison reviewed the early history of arbitration in Antitrust Agreements
and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Poli-
cies, 64 NC L Rev 219, 222-25 (1986). See also Leeson & Johnston, Ending It at 47-49 (cited
in note 11); A.W. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two
Ships Peerless, 11 Cardozo L Rev 287, 321-22 (1989); William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of
Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 L & Soc Rev 63 (1974); Melvin Aron Eisen-
berg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89
Harv L Rev 637, 640-42.
21 See, for example, Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public In-
terest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 Hastings L J 239, 251-52 (1987).
,3 Id at 252, referring to the scholarship of Owen M. Fiss in, for example, Against Set-
tlement, 93 Yale L J 1073, 1085 (1984).
24 In the federal courts, Congress prompted this change in attitude through its enact-
ment in 1925 of the Federal Arbitration Act, codified at 9 USC §§ 1-15 (1988), which makes
agreements to arbitrate that are in or that affect interstate commerce enforceable. 9 USC
§ 2 (1988).
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Indeed, arbitration has recently become the darling of the Su-
preme Court. In case after case, the Court has found agreements to
arbitrate future disputes enforceable, no matter how "public" the
area of law implicated and no matter how unfamiliar the agreed
forum seems.2 Thus, in terms of the broader interests in civil liti-
gation noted above, parties are entitled to waive in advance their
right to present certain defined disputes to the civil courts, as long
as the agreement between them is otherwise enforceable. This is
consistent with the long tradition holding that a defendant with a
good objection to the personal jurisdiction of a forum may waive
the point, formerly by submitting to the court's general jurisdic-
tion, and today in federal court by failing to raise the issue in a
timely fashion.2 6 The trend toward permitting arbitration of public
law questions, like compliance with the antitrust and securities
laws, is not without its risks, 7 and is troublesome given the public
functions of civil litigation discussed above. For purposes of this
preliminary classification, however, the key feature of agreements
to arbitrate is their consensual, non-judicial nature. Analogies be-
tween this form of private adjudication and the court-sponsored
mandatory programs must be drawn with great care.2
Classical arbitration is not, however, the only form of volun-
tary dispute resolution available today. Many of the mainstays of
the ADR movement also fit this description. These include early
neutral evaluation ("ENE"), which leads to a recommendation
about the kind of procedure best suited to the case; voluntary me-
diation or "confidential listening" programs; private ("rent-a-
See, for example, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 US
614 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v Byrd, 470 US 213 (1985); Perry v Thomas, 482 US
483 (1987); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v McMahon, 482 US 220 (1987). The Court
continues to insist, however, on the genuineness and binding quality of the basic agreement
to'arbitrate. See, for example, AT&T Technologies v Communications Workers, 475 US 643
(1986); Volt Information Sciences v Board of Trustees, 489 US 468 (1989) (arbitration in a
case involving third parties not compelled where the litigants had agreed to abide by Cali-
fornia law, which permits courts to stay arbitration pending resolution of litigation involving
third parties).
26 See FRCP 12(h)(1); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 US 694 (1982) (holding that the defendant's failure to respond to the plaintiff's
discovery requests on the personal jurisdictional issue allowed the court to decide the issue
against him).
27 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 40
Me L Rev 263 (1988).
28 See Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Con-
stitutional Issues, 68 Or L Rev 487 (1989).
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judge") trials; and voluntary mini-trials or summary jury trials. 9
None of these devices differs in principle from the option that par-
ties have always had to submit their dispute to arbitration after it
was filed in court, even though some invoke arbitration prior to
formal filing and others afterwards.
The leap from consensual forms of ADR-court-sponsored or
independent-to mandatory use of ADR seems at first glance to be
a great one. To borrow a phrase from water law, however, the pro-
cess has been more like accretion than avulsion. Court-annexed
ADR would have made little sense in the pre-1938 world, where
complex pleadings initiated a suit, and the next and last meaning-
ful phase was the trial. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had
the effect of making the pretrial phase of a civil suit a distinct part
of the proceeding that at first was left entirely to the parties, but
that many now view as something that needs to be controlled and
managed by the court.30 This power has not gone unchallenged in
the courts as it has grown.3 1 Nonetheless, today district judges
have substantial power to compel parties to participate in pretrial
proceedings that are designed to assist in the effective manage-
ment of a case.32
Court-annexed arbitration, as it exists in many federal and
state courts today, is one of the mandatory settlement procedures
or nontrial adjudicatory mechanisms, whichever term seems more
apt.3 As these awkward names imply, it and its fellows
(mandatory summary jury trials and mandatory mini-trials) are
2 See Erika S. Fine and Elizabeth S. Plapinger, Overview of Private ADR, in ADR and
the Courts: A Manual for Judges and Lawyers (Center for Public Resources, 1987); Brazil,
1990 U Chi Legal F at 303 (cited in note 11).
"o This change has profoundly affected the idea of the trial. See Richard L. Marcus,
Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 50 U Pitt L Rev 725 (1989). See also John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil
Procedure-Agenda for Reform, 137 U Pa L Rev 1883, 1884 (1989); Judith Resnik, 96 Harv
L Rev 374 (cited in note 4).
" See, for example, Identiseal Corp. of Wisconsin v Positive Identification Systems,
Inc., 560 F2d 298 (7th Cir 1977); Strandell v Jackson County, Ill., 838 F2d 884 (7th Cir
1988).
2 FRCP 16, 26. These powers were substantially enhanced by the 1983 amendments to
the Federal Rules. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Prac-
tice of Rulemaking, 137 U Pa L Rev 1969, 1985 (1989).
" I refer to it as a "mandatory settlement mechanism" because the parties have no
choice, in the cases to which it applies, about whether or not to use it. They must go
through the procedure and decide whether the arbitrator's suggested resolution of the case
is satisfactory-that is, whether they will accept the arbitrator's award in settlement of the
case. I also refer to it as "nontrial adjudication" to make the point that this is an adjudica-
tory procedure that deliberately does not follow the forms of court trials. For those who
wish to pursue all their options, it is but one step along the road to an ultimate trial.
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neither fish nor fowl. Because they are not consensual, the argu-
ments based on consent that support arbitration and related ADR
mechanisms are simply out of place. Because they deviate from
trial procedures, they lack some of the assurances of fairness and
impartiality that formal proceedings contain. Finally, because
"successful" arbitrations do not result in a public hearing and rec-
ord of disposition, these cases do not contribute to the broader de-
velopment of civil law. If court-annexed arbitration is supportable,
it must be either because existing trial mechanisms are unneces-
sary, or because a certain class of cases can and should be handled
differently.
II. AN EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
A. Background: Evolution of Federal Court Programs
Although court-annexed arbitration is not a new procedure,
experiments with its use in the federal courts began only twelve
years ago. State courts had been using a variety of court-related
arbitration procedures since 1952. 3" A careful review of this experi-
ence will set the stage for evaluating the current procedure, and for
considering any changes that may be desirable.
In 1976, one of the recommendations at the influential Na-
tional Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice ("Pound Conference") proposed the
use of arbitration as a potential remedy for the perceived explosion
of cases in both federal and state courts.3 5 In 1977, the Justice De-
partment followed up on these proposals with a draft bill that
would have authorized from five to eight federal courts to experi-
ment with court-annexed arbitration in specific types of civil
3 The first program in the country began in 1952 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The
court identified by rule the types of civil cases that would be reviewed for assignment to
court-certified arbitrators. Leeson & Johnston, Ending It at 78 (cited in note 11). Between
1952 and 1987, the District of Columbia and 22 states adopted some form of court-annexed
arbitration program. Id, citing the National Center for State Courts, State by State Profiles
(1987).
" See Sander, 70 FRD at 131 (cited in note 11). See also Paul Nejelski and Andrew S.
Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 Md L
Rev 787, 798 (1983); E. Allan Lind and John E. Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed
Arbitration in Three Federal District Courts (cited in note 11), in which Lind and Shapard
favorably evaluate state courts' operation of court-annexed arbitration. According to Nejel-
ski and Zeldin, the suggestion of arbitration as a remedy was unrelated to a favorable im-
pression of state programs.
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cases.36 Although that bill did not pass, Congress accomplished the
same goal through the back door by funding three pilot programs
that began in 1978: one in the Northern District of California, an-
other in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the third in the
District of Connecticut (which abandoned the experiment after a
short time).3
The differences among court-annexed arbitration programs,
both at the federal and state level, are important. As Marie
Provine has pointed out, the goals of the programs vary, and thus
the types of procedures and likely effect on the broader judicial
process vary as well.3 8 In some courts, the goal is very much like
that of a summary jury trial-to provide lawyers and their clients
with information about the settlement value of a case. In other
courts, the frank goal has been to terminate the litigation. As the
following discussion demonstrates, the structure of the federal
court programs has consistently been designed to provide an end
to the suit.
In 1978, the three pilot districts adopted local rules that cre-
ated a compulsory arbitration program for cases meeting certain
eligibility requirements. 9 The pilot programs had two important
limitations. First, only cases for money damages were eligible, on
the ground that arbitration is not well suited to equitable claims.
Second, a cap was placed on the amount in controversy ($100,000
in the Northern District of California, $50,000 in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania), on the assumption that larger claims would
be more complex and that the parties would have a greater incen-
tive to demand a trial de novo if more was at stake.
The Eastern Pennsylvania rule also incorporated a number of
additional limitations on the program:
Where the United States is a party, the action must
be brought under (1) the Federal Tort Claims Act, (2)
the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation
Act, or (3) the Miller Act.
Where the United States is not a party and federal
jurisdiction exists, the action must be (1) for injury or
death of a seaman under the Jones Act, (2) based on a
See The Court-Annexed Arbitration Act of 1978: Hearings on S 2253 Before the Sub-
committee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong, 2d Sess 22 (1978) (statement of Griffin B. Bell).
" Nejelski & Zeldin, 42 Md L Rev at 799 (cited in note 35).
's Provine, Settlement Strategies at 44 (cited in note 13).
'o The discussion that follows refers only to the Pennsylvania and California programs.
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negotiable instrument or contract (generally all of which
are diversity cases), (3) for personal injury or property
damage (also virtually all of which are diversity cases), or
(4) for personal injury under the Federal Employees Lia-
bility Act.
Cases based on a claimed violation of a right under
the Constitution are not included.40
The program was administered through the local clerk's office,
which notified the parties when their case had to be referred to an
arbitration panel. The notice fixed a firm date for a hearing, ap-
proximately five months from the date of the notice, and also fixed
a 120-day limitation on discovery. The district judge had the power
to expand or contract the time for discovery.
At the end of the discovery period the case was ready for arbi-
tration, with one important qualification. The parties were entitled
to file a motion for summary judgment or similar relief. If the mo-
tion was filed prior to referral, then referral would be postponed
until the court ruled on the motion. Such a postponement intro-
duced the risk of new delays in the proceeding. In contrast, the
court generally did not stay the arbitration if a dispositive motion
was filed after referral. Most cases, as is also true generally, were
resolved prior to arbitration.
The procedure for selecting the arbitrators relied entirely on
volunteers. The clerk's office compiled a list of arbitrators, select-
ing from lawyers who met certain minimal qualifications. The vol-
unteers categorized themselves as "plaintiffs' lawyers," "defense
lawyers," or "cannot be categorized." If parties wanted to select
their own arbitrators, they were not required to use these volun-
teers. The arbitrators served on panels of three, usually sitting for
three hearings a day. Each arbitrator received $75 per hearing for
his or her services. Paul Nejelski and Andrew Zeldin wrote that the
Federal Rules of Evidence were used in "an informal manner," cit-
ing as an example a relaxation in the formal requirements for doc-
ument authentication.4' Written transcripts were not prepared as a
matter of course, but a party could request (and pay for) a court
reporter.
Panels issued their decisions "promptly" after the hearing by
filing an award with the clerk of the court. Either party was then
entitled to file, within thirty days, a written demand for a trial de
40 Nejelski & Zeldin, 42 Md L Rev at 801 (cited in note 35).
4, Id at 803.
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novo in the district court. Somewhat contradictorily, Nejelski and
Zeldin said "[n]o prejudice attaches from the arbitration award.
Evidence from the hearing is admissible at trial only for impeach-
ment purposes. '4 2 However, although "no additional cost is as-
sessed for filing for trial de novo," the moving party had to make a
deposit with the court equal to the arbitration fees, that would be
lost if the final judgment was not more favorable than the arbitral
award.43 In other words, the arbitration award operated much like
an offer of judgment pursuant to FRCP 68.""
By 1985, the number of federal districts using court-annexed
arbitration had expanded to ten-the original two that retained
their pilot programs plus eight new districts.45 Three years later, in
Title IX of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
Congress finally provided statutory authority for court-annexed ar-
bitration in selected federal courts and outlined some of the proce-
dural rules that such programs would have to follow.46
Congress's embrace of court-annexed arbitration in the Judi-
cial Improvements Act was cautious. The statute continues to treat
arbitration as an experimental program, although it draws on both
the federal court experiences outlined above and state court exper-
iences.47 Twenty districts will eventually participate in the new
program: the ten specified in section 658(1) of the statute, and ten
to be selected by the Judicial Conference, pursuant to section
658(2)." Section 651(a) allows each of the 20 district courts de-
42 Id at 804, citing ED Pa R Civ P 8.7(c).
43 Id, citing ED Pa R Civ P 8.2, 8.7(d).
41 Present Rule 68 allows a defendant to make a formal offer of judgment to the plain-
tiff. If the plaintiff refuses the offer and the ultimate judgment is "not more favorable than
the offer," the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made. FRCP 68. See
Marek v Chesny, 473 US 1 (1985). For a discussion of the economic effects of the rule, see
Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J Legal Stud 93 (1986).
4' Patricia A. Ebener and Donna R. Betancourt, Court-Annexed Arbitration: The Na-
tional Picture 6 (RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 1985). The ten districts with planned or
ongoing programs were the Northern District of California, the Middle District of Florida,
the Western District of Michigan, the Western District of Missouri, the District of New
Jersey, the Middle District of North Carolina, the Western District of Oklahoma, the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, and the Southern and Western Districts of Texas. See also A.
Leo Levin and Deirdre Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District Courts,
37 U Fla L Rev 29, 32-36 (1985).
41 Pub L No 100-702, Title IX (cited in note 5), codified at 28 USCA §§ 651-58 (West
1968 & Supp 1990).
4, For a review of state court programs, see NCSC, State by State Profiles (cited in
note 34).
48 Section 658(1) selects the following districts for the full program: the Northern Dis-
trict of California, the Middle District of Florida, the Western District of Michigan, the
Western District of Missouri, the District of New Jersey, the Eastern District of New York,
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scribed in section 658 to "authorize by local rule the use of arbitra-
tion in any civil action, including an adversary proceeding in
bankruptcy."
Whether the district court has the power to require arbitra-
tion, however, depends upon whether Congress specifically named
the district or whether the Judicial Conference selected it. Dis-
tricts that Congress named are empowered to refer civil actions to
arbitration when the parties consent, and they may:
require the referral to arbitration of any civil action
pending before it if the relief sought consists only of
money damages not in excess of $100,000 or such lesser
amount as the district court may set, exclusive of interest
and costs. 9
In an interesting contrast to the amount in controversy rules that
prevail in diversity cases, 50 the arbitration statute states that "[f]or
purposes of paragraph (1)(B), a district court may presume dam-
ages are not in excess of $100,000 unless counsel certifies that dam-
ages exceed such amount."51 Finally, if one of the named districts
had a local rule on the date of the statute's enactment providing
for a limitation on money damages of $150,000 for court-annexed
arbitration, section 901(c) of the Act permits that district to retain
the higher ceiling.
In addition, the statute defines certain classes of cases that
may not be referred to arbitration, even if they otherwise fall
within the scope of section 652(a)(1)(B): (1) actions based on "an
alleged violation of a right secured by the Constitution," and (2)
actions in which jurisdiction is based on 28 USC § 1343 (civil
the Middle District of North Carolina, the Western District of Oklahoma, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, and the Western District of Texas. With the exception of the Eastern
District of New York, these are the same districts that were operating programs in 1985.
The list does not include the Southern District of Texas from the 1985 group.
Section 658(2) requires the Judicial Conference of the United States to add ten addi-
tional districts to the list, and to notify the Federal Judicial Center and the public of the
districts chosen. The Conference has named the following districts: the Western District of
Washington, the Middle District of Georgia, the Western District of Kentucky, the North-
ern District of New York, the Western District of New York, the Western District of Penn-
sylvania, the Eastern District of Texas, the Western District of Virginia, the District of
Utah, and the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of Indiana. Telephone interview
with Gloria Chamot, Federal Judicial Center, Aug 28, 1990.
" 28 USCA § 652(a)(1)(B) (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
0 See St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v Red Cab Co., 303 US 283, 288-89 (1938),
which establishes the rule that "[ult must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really
for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal." (Emphasis added.)
"1 28 USCA § 652(a)(2) (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
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rights and elective franchise).2 Beyond these general prohibitions,
the district courts must also issue local rules establishing proce-
dures for exempting cases from arbitration, sua sponte or on a
party's motion,
in which the objectives of arbitration would not be
realized-
(1) because the case involves complex or novel legal
issues,
(2) because legal issues predominate over factual is-
sues, or
(3) for other good cause."
Both the districts named by Congress and those named by the
Judicial Conference may permit court-annexed arbitration by con-
sent. 4 Local rules must assure that consent to arbitration is freely
and knowingly obtained, and that no party or attorney is
prejudiced for refusing to participate in it.55 No general public in-
terest exceptions exist that are analogous to the specific exceptions
for constitutional and civil rights claims in the mandatory arbitra-
tion procedure.
The statute also establishes some procedural rules for arbitra-
tion conducted under its authority. 6 Most important, perhaps, is
the provision governing the selection of arbitrators. The district
courts enjoy virtually unfettered discretion to "establish standards
for the certification of arbitrators," as long as the arbitrators take
the oath or affirmation described in 28 USC § 453 and are subject
to the disqualification rules of 28 USC § 455.57 Arbitrators are in-
52 28 USCA § 652(b) (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
's 28 USCA § 652(c) (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
" For districts named in the statute, see 28 USCA §§ 651(a), 652(a)(1)(A), 658(1) (West
1968 & Supp 1990); for districts designated by the Judicial Conference, see 28 USCA
§§ 651(a), 652(a)(1)(A), 658(2) (West 1968 & Supp 1990). This provision is a little peculiar,
since many believed that the district courts had power to permit consensual court-annexed
arbitration without a new statute. See FRCP 16(c)(7). The statute may,however, have been
designed to clarify this question, since some courts had taken a stricter view of the matter.
See, for example, Strandell, 838 F2d 884.
28 USCA § 652(d) (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
'6 28 USCA §§ 653, 654, 656 and 657 (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
07 28 USCA § 656 (West 1968 & Supp 1990). The oath in section 453 is the general oath
or affirmation taken by each justice or judge of the United States. The standards in section
455 require the disqualification of justices, judges, or magistrates in any case in which their
impartiality might be questioned, or in a variety of other particular circumstances in which
the judge has an actual interest in the litigation (financial or otherwise). See 28 USC §§ 453,
455 (1988).
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dependent contractors for purposes of federal law." Finally, the
district courts must establish and pay compensation to arbitrators,
within any limits that the Judicial Conference may set.59
The statutory provisions concerning the arbitrator's powers
are short and to the point. The arbitrator shall have the power,
within the district where the referring court is located:
(1) to conduct arbitration hearings,
(2) to administer oaths and affirmations, and
(3) to make awards.60
In addition, the provisions of Rule 45 concerning subpoenas for the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evi-
dence are applicable to the arbitration hearing."1
The hearing itself must begin no later than either 180 days
after the filing of the answer or 30 days after the court's ruling on
certain dispositive motions.2 The statute offers no other guidance
on the ways in which hearings should be conducted. Though sec-
tion 902 authorizes the Judicial Conference to develop model rules
relating to procedures for arbitration, apparently those rules would
not be mandatory for districts participating in the program. In.
practice, hearings have tended to be more informal, with relaxed
evidentiary rules, a less structured relationship between the parties
and the attorneys, a more accessible role for the arbitrator and,
obviously, no juries.
At the conclusion of the procedure, the arbitrator issues an
award, either specifying the amount of money the defendant owes
or stating that plaintiff takes nothing. The award must be filed
promptly with the clerk of the district court, along with proof of
service to the other party. If neither party exercises his or her
" 28 USCA § 656(b). As such they are subject to the provisions of 18 USC §§ 201-211,
which relate to bribery, graft and conflicts of interest for public officials. 18 USC §§ 201-211
(1988).
" 28 USCA § 657(a). Those compensation levels have been extremely low, as noted
'above. See, generally, Elizabeth Rolph, Introducing Court-Annexed Arbitration: A Poli-
cymaker's Guide (RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 1984).
6 28 USCA § 653(a) (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
61 28 USCA § 653(c) (West 1968 & Supp 1990); FRCP 45.
-- 28 USCA § 653(b) (West 1968 & Supp 1990). These motions are a motion to dismiss
the complaint, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a motion to join necessary parties,
or a motion for summary judgment. See FRCP 12(b)(6), 12(c), 12(b)(7), 56. Any such mo-
tion must have been filed within the time period specified by the court. The statutory time
periods are subject to modification by the court "for good cause shown." 28 USCA § 653(b)
(West 1968 & Supp 1990).
6 Pub L No 100-702, § 902, 102 Stat at 4663 (cited in note 5).
6 28 USCA § 654 (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
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right to demand a trial de novo, 5 the award is entered as the judg-
ment of the court. With respect to the effect of the judgment, the
statute provides:
The judgment so entered shall be subject to the same
provisions of law and shall have the same force and effect
as a judgment of the court in a civil action, except that
the judgment shall not be subject to review in any other
court by appeal or otherwise."'
This language indicates that the arbitral award, no matter how de-
tailed or terse, carries with it both claim and issue preclusive
effects.
Arbitral awards are, however, subject to confidentiality limita-
tions similar to those available to settlement discussions prior to
the entry of judgment on an award. Section 654(b) states that
[t]he district court shall provide by local rule that the
contents of any arbitration award made under this chap-
ter shall not be made known to any judge who might be
assigned to the case-
(1) except as necessary for the court to determine
whether to assess costs or attorney fees under section
655,
(2) until the district court has entered final judgment
in the action or the action has been otherwise termi-
nated, or
(3) except for purposes of preparing the report re-
quired by section 903(b) of [the Act]."
Thus, the statute guarantees confidentiality only vis-A-vis any
judge who might hear the case de novo, for the purposes of that
hearing. It is silent about the confidentiality of the record in the
proceeding, and about the status of materials that are produced in
connection with the arbitral discovery process.
The new statute, like the experimental programs before it,
guarantees parties the right to trial de novo in the district court. 8
However, and again typically, the assertion of this right is not
costless. First, in any case falling within the mandatory arbitration
limits, the cost of asserting the right to a trial in the Article III
65 See 28 USCA § 655 (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
" 28 USCA § 654(a) (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
-1 28 USCA § 654(b) (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
68 28 USCA § 655 (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
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court is increased by the additional costs attributable to the arbi-
tration. Second, the district court is entitled to provide by local
rule that arbitrator fees paid under section 657 "may be taxed as
costs against the party demanding the trial de novo." Fees will be
taxable as costs unless the party demanding the trial "obtains a
final judgment more favorable than the arbitration award," or "the
court determines that the demand for the trial de novo was made
for good cause."
This structure is again similar to Rule 68.69 The important dif-
ference is that under Rule 68 the party who fails to obtain a judg-
ment more favorable than the defendant's offer must pay "the
costs incurred after the making of the offer," while under section
655(d) the penalty is the amount of the arbitrator's fee. Another
difference is that, under section 655(d), even if the final judgment
is not more favorable than the arbitration award, the penalty may
not ensue if the court determines that the demand for a trial de
novo was made for good cause. For arbitrations by consent, the
statute has a potentially stronger disincentive for demanding a
trial de novo. In those cases, the district court may assess both
costs and "reasonable attorneys' fees" against the party demanding
the trial de novo, if
(1) such party fails to obtain a judgment, exclusive of
interest and costs, in the court which is substantially
more favorable to such party than the arbitration award,
and
(2) the court determines that the party's conduct in
seeking a trial de novo was in bad faith.7"
Since Title IX is a pilot program, it also contains provisions
for reviewing its success or failure. Section 903(a) requires the Di-
rector of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to include
"statistical information" about the court-annexed arbitration pro-
grams in its annual report.7' Section 903(b) sets out the require-
ments for the final report. The information called for tends to be
subjective in nature, including, for example, "the level of satisfac-
tion with the arbitration programs . . . by a sampling of court per-
sonnel, attorneys, and litigants"; "the levels of satisfaction relative
to the cost per hearing of each program"; and "a summary of...
"' See note 44.
70 28 USCA § 655(e) (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
" Pub L No 100-702, § 903(a), 102 Stat at 4663 (cited in note 5). The statute does not
specify the types of statistical information contemplated.
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program features ... identified as being related to program
acceptance." '72
What is missing from Title IX, although the final reports
could cure this on'their own initiative, is a sound comparison be-
tween the arbitrated cases and the general pool of cases. It is well
known that many cases in which $100,000 or $150,000 is at stake
settle at present even without arbitration.s Only with a group of
control cases that permit a valid comparison between arbitration
and court results achieved by different styles of judicial manage-
ment will it be possible to tell whether the pilot court-annexed ar-
bitration program should be continued or not, from both the objec-
tive (cost-based) standpoint and from the standpoint of fairness,
client satisfaction and public interest.
B. Judicial Review of Court-Annexed Arbitration
With only occasional exceptions, the federal courts have been
overwhelmingly hospitable to the ADR family that includes court-
annexed arbitration, mandatory settlement conferences and sum-
mary jury trials. Through the device of refusing to cooperate with
the program in question, parties have raised claims under the Sev-
enth Amendment, the due process clause (and its equal protection
component), the Rules Enabling Act and Rules 16 and 83 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, these across-the-board
challenges to the constitutional, statutory or rule-based authority
for the programs have not generally succeeded.
1. Inherent Power to Manage Dockets.
The court-sponsored mandatory ADR mechanisms have a
number of points in common. All of them take place during the
pretrial phase of a civil proceeding; none of them cuts off a party's
right to demand a traditional trial in court, before a jury, if appro-
priate. Thus, arguments for or against court-annexed ADR must
begin by taking a position on the scope of a district court's power
to control its own docket. If that power is broad, then it is difficult
to see why court-annexed ADR does not fall within it; if that
72 Id.
71 See Hensler, 1990 U Chi Legal F at 407 (cited in note 11); and notes 2, 4 and 12.
Studies of litigation satisfaction show that people seem to like court-annexed arbitration.
See Christopher Simoni, Michael B. Wise and Michael Finigan, Litigant and Attorney Atti-
tudes Toward Court-Annexed Arbitration: An Empirical Study, 28 Santa Clara L Rev 543
(1988).
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power is narrower, there is more room to argue that ADR is inher-
ently flawed.
The Supreme Court has recognized an inherent power to con-
trol dockets apart from any particular powers the courts may have
under the Judicial Code or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'
Most recently, in Newman-Green, Inc. v Alfonzo-Larrain,75 the
Court found that this type of inherent power underlay the power
of the court of appeals to grant a motion to dismiss a dispensable
party whose presence spoils statutory diversity jurisdiction. In a
case involving an order requiring a litigant to appear in person at a
pretrial settlement conference, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, wrote that the inherent power to manage dockets
likewise forms the basis for continued development of
procedural techniques designed to make the operation of
the court more efficient, to preserve the integrity of the
judicial process, and to control courts' dockets.76
This power was limited, in the court's view, only by the "obvious"
observation that it could not be exercised "in a manner inconsis-
tent with rule or statute. '77
The Seventh Circuit's strong presumption in favor of inherent
management power is typical of other courts. For example, in Mat-
ter of Sanction of Baker,78 the Tenth Circuit found broad power to
impose sanctions for refusals to cooperate with pretrial orders. Dis-
trict courts have relied in part on this concept of inherent power to
uphold, among other things, orders enforcing strict time limits, 79
orders requiring participation in summary jury trials80 and orders
7' See, for example, Roadway Express, Inc. v Piper, 447 US 752, 764-67 (1980); Link v
Wabash Railroad Co., 370 US 626, 630-31 (1962) ("The authority of a court to dismiss sua
sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an inherent power governed
not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.").
75 109 S Ct 2218, 2224 (1989). The inherent power ruling was in the alternative.- The
Court first found that FRCP 21 authorized the appellate action. Id at 2223. Two justices,
Kennedy and Scalia, dissented on the ground that the power was not inherent after all, and
that Rule 21 could not be used since the Federal Rules must not be construed to expand a
court's jurisdiction (FRCP 82). The dissenting opinion would require more specific authority
from Congress. Id at 2226 (Kennedy, with whom Scalia joined, dissenting).
6 G. Heileman Brewing Co. v Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F2d 648, 651 (7th Cir 1989).
"' Id at 652.
78 744 F2d 1438, 1441 (10th Cir 1984).
7' See United States v Reaves, 636 F Supp 1575 (ED Ky 1986).
"0 See, for example, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v Carey-Canada, Inc., 123
FRD 603, 604 (D Minn 1988).
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requiring participation in settlement conferences.8 1 The idea that
pretrial procedures are somehow optional for the litigants, and
may be disregarded by the parties if authority for each order is not
precisely spelled out in statutes or rules, was probably never cor-
rect; in any event, there is little or no support for it today.
Notwithstanding the broad managerial power that district
judges enjoy today,82 it remains true that a distinction exists be-
tween managing adjudication, which is desirable, and mandating
outcomes, which is impermissible. Occasionally, when judges have
become too aggressive, appellate courts have been forced to remind
them that management does not mean coercing settlements.8 3 Fur-
thermore, the availability of nontraditional procedures to assist
settlement does not mean by some parity of reasoning that proce-
dural and evidentiary rules at formal hearings before the court
may be disregarded. 4 Inherent powers, in short, have their limits,
and the court-sponsored ADR programs must stay within those
limits.
2. Seventh Amendment Challenges.
On a more specific level, court-annexed arbitration and its sis-
ter procedures have been attacked as inconsistent with the Sev-
enth Amendment. Even though a jury trial is theoretically possible
in the trial following arbitration, the trial is delayed and becomes
more expensive for the parties asserting the right. No court to
date, however, has struck down a court-sponsored ADR program
on this ground, even though there is some validity to both
criticisms.
The most comprehensive analysis of the Seventh Amendment
issue occurs in an early district court opinion on court-annexed ar-
bitration. In the case of Kimbrough v Holiday Inn,85 the court, re-
lying in part on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania,8 6 decided that the critical question was whether the
court-annexed arbitration procedure placed unduly burdensome
conditions on the right to the jury trial. In evaluating the burdens,
the court also considered the benefits provided by the arbitration
programs, including the opportunity to test the validity of claims
promptly before a neutral arbiter, the enhanced likelihood of set-
81 See Lockhart v Patel, 115 FRD 44 (ED Ky 1987).
82 See Resnik, 96 Harv L Rev 374 (cited in note .4).
" See Kothe v Smith, 771 F2d 667 (2d Cir 1985).
8 Proimos v Fair Automotive Repair, Inc., 808 F2d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir 1987).
" 478 F Supp 566, 570 (ED Pa 1979).
8 Application of Smith, 381 Pa 223, 112 A2d 625 (1955).
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tlement, and the streamlining of the case.8 7 The greatest burden it
found was the potential expense of a full-blown arbitration hear-
ing-a cost of jury trial that would not be borne in the absence of
this procedure. Nonetheless, the court concluded that, on balance,
court-annexed arbitration did not place an unconstitutional bur-
den on Seventh Amendment rights.8
In light of the general approach that the Supreme Court has
taken toward the Seventh Amendment-that is, reading it to pre-
serve the essential aspects of the common law right to jury trial,
but not. the particular details of the 1791 practice1 9-the Kim-
brough court seems clearly correct. If the delays and expense at-
tributable, for example, to court-annexed arbitration amounted to
a Seventh Amendment violation, then the entire structure of pre-
trial discovery and pretrial conferences would seem equally vulner-
able. The courts should, and by general consensus do, have the
right to insist that the public resources consumed by a civil jury
trial be spent wisely. Thus, before the trial begins, the case must
be adequately prepared, and the court must be convinced that the
parties do not wish to settle the dispute in a truly voluntary man-
ner. Court-annexed arbitration can advance both of those goals in
much the same way as other aspects of pretrial procedure. There is
no reason to create an expansive reading of the Seventh Amend-
ment that would call so much into question.
3. Federal Statutes and Rules.
The 1988 legislation described above has put to rest most of
the statutory and rule-based objections to the experimental court-
annexed arbitration programs in the federal courts.90 The one
noteworthy decision that had struck down a mandatory court-
sponsored ADR program was the Seventh Circuit's ruling in
Strandell v Jackson County. 1 The district judge there ordered the
parties to participate in a summary jury trial. The plaintiffs' law-
87 Kimbrough, 478 F Supp at 571.
88 See also Rhea v Massey-Ferguson, 767 F2d 266, 268-69 (6th Cir 1985); New England
Merchants Bank v Hughes, 556 F Supp 712, 714 (ED Pa 1983).
88 See, generally, Beacon Theatres, Inc. v Westover, 359 US 500 (1959); Dairy Queen,
Inc. v Wood, 369 US 469 (1962); Ross v Bernhard, 396 US 531 (1970).
80 1 say "most objections" because the legislation, as noted above in note 4, also author-
ized the ten programs that will be limited to consensual arbitration. If this is for clarifica-
tion or funding purposes, then no broader questions arise. If, on the other hand, it implies
that in the absence of statutory authorization districts do not have power to conduct con-
sensual pretrial arbitrations, then questions about the scope of FRCP 16 and the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 USC §§ 2072-74, will continue to be important.
91 838 F2d 884 (7th Cir 1988).
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yer refused, stating that he was ready to go to trial and that he did
not want to disclose privileged materials at the summary proceed-
ing. When the lawyer did not appear at the scheduled summary
jury trial, the district court held him in criminal contempt. On ap-
peal, the Seventh Circuit found that Rule 16 did not authorize the
mandatory use of the summary jury trial, and it also expressed
concern about the influence the procedure would have on privileges
from discovery.
Strandell was widely criticized by other district courts and
does not appear to have been followed in any other circuit.9 2 In a
brief per curiam opinion, the Sixth Circuit upheld a mandatory
mediation program against challenges under the Seventh Amend-
ment and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38(b) (jury demand),
39(a) (docketing as a jury case), 53 (use of masters), and 72-76 (use
of magistrates).' 3 Lack of authority under the statutes or rules is,
in any event, easily curable if the political desire to experiment
with these programs is present. Given the new federal legislation,
this issue seems destined to die.
4. Due Process..
The most difficult legal question remaining about court-
annexed arbitration and the mandatory ADR procedures is their
consistency with due process. The process that is required in gen-
eral for civil cases is less clear than for their criminal counterparts.
Furthermore, due process problems can arise in individual cases
even if one concludes that court-annexed arbitration is, in general,
compatible with due process norms.
Unless one could show that mandatory ADR deprives people
of their day in court or otherwise distorts the trial de novo, it
would be difficult to argue that it violates due process on its face.
After all, programs such as court-annexed arbitration give litigants
more procedure, not less, and ensure access to a trial de novo. The
interesting questions arise in two areas: what features should the
arbitral process include to assure due process, and how, if at all,
might the arbitral hearing affect the trial on the merits? Finally,
moving beyond the individual rights perspective of due process,
the systemic effects of court-annexed arbitration must be
considered.
92 See, for example, Federal Reserve Bank, 123 FRD 603; McKay v Ashland Oil Co.,
120 FRD 43 (ED Ky 1988). See also Dvorak v Shibata, 123 FRD 608 (D Neb 1988) (regard-
ing mandatory settlement conferences).
" Rhea, 767 F2d 266.
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Procedural quality of arbitral hearings. Since the goal of
court-annexed arbitration is to produce a final resolution of the
dispute as often as possible, the hearing provided must comport
with due process norms.9 4 This means, as usual, notice and an op-
portunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal. Since the great-
est difference between court-annexed arbitration and other forms
of judicial or administrative civil dispute resolution is the deci-
sionmaker, it makes sense to begin an evaluation of procedural
quality there.
Although arbitrators in private, consensual proceedings need
not be impartial decisionmakers,95 this is not and cannot be the
case for court-sponsored proceedings. Indeed, in Morelite Con-
struction Corp. v New York City District Council Carpenters Ben-
efit Funds,9" the court commented in dictum that the impartiality
standards that had been adopted for the original three court-
annexed arbitration programs matched those that are applicable to
federal judges. Congress was obviously alert to this issue as well
when it passed the 1988 Act, since, as noted above, it subjected
arbitrators to the stringent disqualification rules of 28 USC § 455.97
The statute does not indicate, however, how the information rele-
vant to disqualification will be collected or made available to the
parties. In the case of federal judges, of course, extensive records
must be filed on an annual basis disclosing financial and other in-
terests. 8 To impose the identical requirement on every lawyer who
might serve as an arbitrator in a court proceeding would be prohib-
itively expensive to administer and would undoubtedly deter many
qualified individuals from participating in the program. On the
other hand, to rely exclusively on the arbitrator's discretion and
fortuitous public information for disqualifications does little to as-
sure proper administration of Section 455's rules.
, For this purpose, summary jury trials stand on a somewhat different footing. In
courts that use them frequently, they have been described as a routine part of the pretrial
process. See, for example, Caldwell v Ohio Power Co., 710 F Supp 194, 202 (ND Ohio 1989).
Several courts describe the summary jury trial as nothing more than a device to facilitate
settlement. See Cincinnati Gas & Electric v General Electric, 854 F2d 900, 903 (6th Cir
1988); Proimos, 808 F2d at 1278; Fraley v Lake Winnepesaukah, 631 F Supp 160, 163 (ND
Ga 1986).
" Indeed, it is relatively common to have the parties each appoint a partisan arbitrator,
and then have the two partisans appoint a third arbitrator. Leeson & Johnston, Ending It at
51 (cited in note 11).
" 748 F2d 79, 84 n 4 (2d Cir 1984).
'7 See text accompanying notes 55-56; 28 USCA § 656(a)(2) (West 1968 & Supp 1990).
" See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub Law No 101-194, Title II, § 202, codified at 5
USCA App I §§ 101(a), 101(f)(11), 102, 109(10) (West 1968 & Supp 1990), replacing 28 USC
App I.
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It may be possible to design some kind of manageable disclos-
ure form for potential arbitrators that would address this problem.
At this point, however, an appropriately strict statutory standard
for impartiality and lack of bias appears difficult to enforce.
A second concern about arbitrators can be loosely termed
quality control. Some existing programs require a certain number
of years of practice-or other surrogates for competence-for panel
chairs, but those standards are imprecise at best.99 The pay for act-
ing as an arbitrator is extremely low in existing programs; fees
have ranged from nothing to $200 per day or $250 per case.100
Whether this is good or bad for other reasons is debatable, but
surely it indicates that the best lawyers will not devote large
amounts of their time to serving as arbitrators. On the contrary,
service as an arbitrator will compete with all other forms of pro
bono activity that the individual might undertake.
Even though there are serious concerns about quality control,
one might argue that these arbitrators are better than the alterna-
tives: unsupervised settlement, trial to a state or federal judge or
trial to a jury. In ordinary settlements, however, the parties are
represented by the lawyers of their choice, who are at least as
likely as volunteers to be qualified for court-annexed arbitration.
Trial judges, whether federal or state, are people who have com-
mitted their careers (for the time being) to the process of judging,
and hopefully are people who have had the opportunity to accumu-
late experience and expertise at that job.101 Although arbitrators
are not quite the random selection of citizens one finds on a civil
See, for example, NY Rules of Court § 28.4(a) and (b) (McKinney 1989) (requiring
the Chief Administrator of the arbitral program to evaluate qualifications of arbitrators, and
requiring the chair of a panel to be someone admitted to practice for at least five years); Pa
RCP 1302(c) (George T. Bisel Co. 1988) (requiring chair of arbitral board to be admitted for
at least three years); Ill Sup Ct Rule 87(b) (West 1989) (chair of panel must be member of
bar who has engaged in trial practice for at least three years or be a retired judge). Panel
members other than the chair in each of these states must be admitted to practice, but must
meet no other specific statutory criteria.
1o0 Ebener & Betancourt, Court-Annexed Arbitration at 9-10, Table 3 (cited in note
45).
I am not necessarily arguing that the selection processes for either federal or state
judges produce the most qualified people society has for those positions. In federal courts
there has been serious concern in recent years that the pay levels for judges have become so
low that the best lawyers are no longer willing to be considered. See, for example, Justice
for All at 32 (cited in note 1); Richard Posner, The Federal Courts: Crises and Reform 32-
40 (Harvard University Press, 1985). Secondly, the fact that judges are chosen and con-
firmed through a political process means that objective qualifications are not always fore-
most in the selector's mind. The problems with elected state judges may be even greater,
but they go beyond the scope of this paper.
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jury, the offsetting benefits of juries-in the form of the combined
expertise of a group of six or twelve-are not present.
The way to address the quality control issue is far from clear.
Several options are available: (1) "test" the volunteer arbitrators
for competence, or require certain minimum qualifications for in-
clusion on an approved list; (2) create a permanent list from which
arbitrators are drawn, and monitor performance over time, perhaps
also increasing pay to attract better lawyers; or (3) professionalize
the arbitrator corps, so that it looks much more like administrative
law judges or magistrates. The minimal qualification option is the
one now in use, and its problems lie in both the leniency of the
objective standards and the imprecision of measures, such as ad-
mission to the bar or five years in practice. The second is a refine-
ment of the first, but the addition of monitoring, long-term com-
mitment to the system and increased pay make it significantly
different. Note that these arbitrators may have a long-term com-
mitment to the system without necessarily relying exclusively on
their appointments as arbitrators for their income, as do some
criminal defense lawyers. If certain repeat players were almost al-
ways the arbitrators, it would be best to move to the third option.
Professionalizing the arbitrator group and formalizing their rela-
tionship to the courts would be a different way of ensuring a com-
petent and objective decisionmaker for the litigants.
If, however, the third option were adopted, the civil courts
would have created a "lower tier" for eligible cases. The model that
comes closest to this today is that of the bankruptcy courts, al-
though they are not limited to low amounts in controversy and
"simple" cases. It is debatable whether such a lower tier of courts,
lacking trial by jury and other formal procedures, from which one
would have the right to trial de novo before the district court, is a
good idea, or indeed is constitutional. °2 Furthermore, no one
would argue that the existing court-annexed arbitration program
fits this description. It seems that if court-annexed arbitration is to
work the way its proponents contemplate, there is no alternative to
accepting the risk of marginally qualified arbitrators. 13
1o2 See, generally, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
US 50 (1982) (defining adjudication powers of non-Article III bankruptcy judges);
Granfinanciera, S.A. v Nordberg, 109 S Ct 2782 (1989) (defining right to jury trial for fraud-
ulent conveyance action in bankruptcy case).
'o I would not argue that this has been the case so far. As long as court-annexed arbi-
tration is seen as an experimental program, and it receives a great deal of publicity, I would
expect relatively widespread interest from the bar, and a relatively large number of well-
respected lawyers volunteering their time. Over the long run, however, when the novelty
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Moving from arbitrator identity to the actual arbitral process,
several important differences exist, which again are essential to
maintain the advantages of court-annexed arbitration. Because of
strict timetables, discovery is more limited. Rules of evidence at
the hearing tend to be relaxed, and the amount of evidence intro-
duced at the hearing is likely to be more restricted. All three of
these differences help to make the arbitral process more efficient,
and arguably more accessible, to the parties themselves. However,
as noted before, there is a procedural price to pay for these bene-
fits in the form of a greater risk of a decision being based on in-
complete or unreliable evidence.
Interaction between arbitral hearing and trial de novo. Liti-
gants pay a price for their right to a trial in an Article III court
when they must decide whether to accept the arbitral award or to
invoke that right. The arbitral process raises the cost of a trial de
novo in two ways: first, the direct and indirect costs of the arbitra-
tion must be added to the rest of the litigant's pretrial expendi-
tures; and second, the litigant who wants a trial de novo is subject
to statutory penalties in the amount of the arbitrator's fee if the
final result is not more favorable than the arbitration award, or if
the court decides the demand for the trial de novo was not sup-
ported by good cause. 10 4
It is easy to understand the initial impulse to place impedi-
ments in the way of the trial de novo. It would be foolish to struc-
ture court-annexed arbitration in such a way that it simply adds
one more step to an already cumbersome system of civil procedure.
On the other hand, to the extent that the system pushes litigants
to accept the results of compulsory arbitration, the procedural
short-cuts of arbitration become more troublesome. An award
could, for example, be based on hearsay evidence that would not
be admissible at the trial de novo. A jury might get a different feel
for a case when all the witnesses are called, as compared with the
arbitrator's impressions based on a smaller sample. If further dis-
wears off, demands for more reliable assurances of quality control would become more
urgent.
104 28 USCA § 655(d)(2) (West 1968 & Supp 1990). Interestingly, for arbitrations con-
ducted because the parties requested them, that is, consensual arbitration, the penalties for
demanding a trial de novo are stricter under the federal statute. Rather than simply the
arbitrator's fee, the district court may assess costs pursuant to 28 USCA § 1920 (West 1968
& Supp 1990), and attorneys' fees against the party demanding the new trial, if that party
fails to obtain a judgment substantially more favorable than the arbitration award, and the
court decides that the demand for a new trial was in bad faith. 28 USCA § 655(e) (West
1968 & Supp 1990).
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covery is possible after the arbitration, the factual background of
the two proceedings would be inherently different.
These differences do not matter if the parties have freely cho-
sen arbitration for the resolution of their dispute. They add up to
second-class justice, however, in some subset of the cases that are
submitted to compulsory arbitration-those whose results are af-
fected by the truncated procedures. Since it is virtually impossible
to identify those cases ex ante and to exempt them from arbitra-
tion, some other response is necessary. In the end, there may be no
better alternative than the market: if the parties wish to demand a
trial de novo after undergoing the time and expense of an arbitra-
tion, let them do so without any additional penalties. At any such
trial, if the relevant law gives a right to costs and attorneys' fees to
the winning party, the costs of the arbitration would be included.
If it does not, however, then the arbitration should be treated ex-
actly like any other part of the pretrial proceedings.
The arbitration hearing may affect the trial de novo in one
final way that is troublesome from a different perspective. Because
evidence is revealed for the arbitration, the hearing may affect
post-arbitration settlement discussions or the trial de novo. In
Strandel, 10 5 for example, the Seventh Circuit was concerned that
information protected by the work-product privilege would be re-
vealed at the arbitration hearing. Once out, of course, this evidence
cannot be recalled, even if the rules formally state that evidence
from the arbitration hearing is not admissible at the trial de
novo.106 Even assuming that access to the trial de novo is limited
only by the parties' own calculations of how much to invest in the
litigation, the key question is whether the court-annexed arbitra-
tion influences the trial before the Article III court in a manner
that differs from conventional pretrial proceedings (such as discov-
ery). Although any additional influence due to court-annexed arbi-
tration appears to be minimal, this is an important effect to be
studied.
Systemic issues. The systemic problems of court-annexed ar-
bitration are different from those that affect the particular liti-
gants. As noted above, the creation of this system may just be a
somewhat clumsy way of establishing a lower tier of "sub-district"
108 838 F2d 884 (7th Cir 1988).
.o See 28 USC § 655(c) (West 1968 & Supp 1990). Note, however, that evidence that
would otherwise be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence is not covered by that
rule. Thus, statements by the parties at the arbitration hearing would presumably be admis-
sible at the trial de novo. See FRE 801(d).
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federal civil courts, for certain defined classes of cases. If that is
what the public and Congress want, then it would be far better to
establish openly such a lower tier. Access to the "sub-district"
courts would be better, the obligations of the judges and their ac-
countability to the public would be more clear, and proceedings
and decisions would be public. The information generated by civil
litigation would be available to those who need it, for example to
those with similar small stakes civil suits. Lower tier courts might
also seem attractive for other kinds of litigation, such as habeas
corpus cases and social security disability cases.10 7 In short, court-
annexed arbitration from a public point of view may be the open-
ing gambit in a much more profound reform of the federal courts.
Some of the differences between court-annexed arbitration
and court proceedings are also problematic from the systemic
standpoint. For example, arbitral proceedings are usually con-
ducted behind closed doors, just like settlement. Even though
judgment is entered on an award, the factual information and legal
reasoning that led to that judgment are typically kept confidential.
If court-annexed arbitration becomes the predominant method of
resolving disputes that meet its eligibility criteria, public input and
public judgment about the governing law will be severely compro-
mised. As noted at the beginning of this article, if one takes the
position that civil courts are outmoded anyway, this consequence is
unimportant. That, however, is a proposition that I find exceed-
ingly difficult to defend.
III. Is COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION WORTH IT?
As the discussion thus far illustrates, court-annexed arbitra-
tion is an interesting and innovative procedure, but it is worth
pausing in the rush to find solutions for crowded dockets to think
about what kinds of legal trade-offs it entails. I realize that this
call for caution may sound odd, or downright contrary, in the face
of the careful studies conducted by organizations such as the
RAND Institute for Civil Justice and the California courts' 08-all
,01 The Federal Courts Study Committee proposes the creation of a new structure for
adjudicating disability claims under the Social Security Act, which would use administrative
law judges and an Article I Court of Disability Claims. Federal Courts Study Committee
Report at 55 (cited in note 1). The Committee also recommends a stronger exhaustion re-
quirement for state prisoner civil rights suits. Id at 48. The Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee Report came to no conclusions about state habeas petitions, although it discusses this
matter in more detail in part III. Id at 51.
,08 Ebener & Betancourt, Court-Annexed Arbitration (cited in note 45); Simoni, Wise
& Finigan, 28 Santa Clara L Rev at 577 (cited in note 73); Report on Effectiveness of Judi-
4211
452 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
of which seem to show that participants in mandatory arbitration
find it fair, open to their input and acceptably priced. Nonetheless,
when one considers what problems court-annexed arbitration is
supposedly addressing, it seems rather clear that, where it helps at
all, it is at most a second-best solution for more pervasive ills in
the system.
The list of the problems in the court system that court-
annexed arbitration is designed to address is an impressive one. It
includes:
1) Delays and docket congestion."l 9
2) Lengthy and formalistic proceedings.110
3) Procedural technicalities."'
4) Discovery abuse.'1 2
5) Client alienation." 3
6) Increasing judicial efficiency."'
7) Avoiding the (out-of-date) civil jury."9
None of these problems is unique to cases involving an amount in
controversy of less than $150,000, a contract or tort dispute, or a
small stakes federal statutory (except constitutional or civil rights)
claim. Unless one can show how devices such as court-annexed ar-
bitration make a positive contribution to those issues that some-
how benefits both the case sent to arbitration and the rest of the
pending cases, it is hard to resist the conclusion that court-
annexed arbitration is actually a distraction from the more funda-
mental reforms that the civil procedure system needs.
What, for example, does court-annexed arbitration do about
the problem of delay and overcrowding of civil dockets? It appears,
from studies that have been undertaken, that the vast majority of
the cases sent to arbitration never reach the trial de novo stage,
cial Arbitration, in Judicial Council of California, 1984 Annual Report 6. See also Hensler,
1990 U Chi Legal F 399 (cited in note 11); Brazil, 1990 U Chi Legal F 303 (cited in note 11).
,09 See Honeywell Protection Services v Tandem Telecommunications, Inc., 131 Misc
2d 814, 495 NYS2d 130 (1985).
... Steven Weller, John C. Ruhnka and John A. Martin, Compulsory Civil Arbitration:
The Rochester Answer to Court Backlogs, 20 Judges' J 36, 36-37 (Summer 1981).
"' Id.
" Kimbrough, 478 F Supp at 571.
'3 Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, 20 Judges' J at 41.
.. Simoni, Wise & Finigan, 28 Santa Clara L Rev at 544 (cited in note 73). But see
Hensler, 1990 U Chi Legal F at 410-13 (cited in note 11).
11 See, for example, the concurring opinion of California Chief Justice Rose Bird in
Lyons v Wickhorst, 42 Cal 3d 911, 727 P2d 1019, 321 Cal Rptr 738 (1986), in which the
court seems concerned that court-annexed arbitration may be a means for the avoidance of
civil jury trials.
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and thus never call on the court's trial resources. It is also true,
however, that most of these cases would have been settled anyway.
Thus, looking strictly at delay, it is hard to detect any unique con-
tribution on the part of court-annexed arbitration. Indeed, more
cases may enter the system if litigants come to rely on arbitration,
causing a slightly higher equilibrium ratio of cases to dispute reso-
lution resources.116
The points about lengthy and formalistic proceedings and pro-
cedural technicalities are related. The forms of action may not be
ruling us from their graves any more, 1 7 but fifty-two years of expe-
rience under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have given us
our own version of unchecked procedural growth.118 Trial practice
by common consensus has three or four stages: pleadings, pretrial,
trial and remedies. Though it is at its most formal during the trial
phase, which still uses much of the ritual inherited from England,
the other phases are influenced by the possibility of a trial. The
rules of evidence contain at least as many procedural technicalities
as the civil procedure rules, whether one refers to the latest version
of the hearsay rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence or the federal
common law or state law of privilege.
What is needed in this connection is not an evasion of formal-
ity and strict procedural and evidentiary rules for some cases that
happen to fit the court-annexed arbitration criteria. Instead, there
must be a careful study of how and when formality assists the civil
dispute resolution process. It is possible that some cases benefit
more from formality than others, and that rules of evidence justify
their existence more in some circumstances than in others. Many
people have noted that the days of a "one size fits all" system of
civil procedure are over, assuming for the sake of discussion that
they ever existed." 9 A case tracking approach, such as the one sug-
gested by the Foundation for Change and Brookings Institution
Task Force, whereby the district courts create separate tracks for
simple cases, standard cases and complex cases, perhaps coupled
with an option for voluntary court-annexed arbitration in any of
16 See, for example, Posner, The Federal Courts at 11 (cited in note 101), noting the
"highway lane" effect whereby the increasing of capacity simply induces more demand for
the service.
... See, generally, F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (Cambridge
University Press, 1909).
'" For two symposia examining this phenomenon, see 137 U Pa L Rev 1873-2257
(1989); and 50 U Pitt L Rev 701-934 (1989).
". See id for representative articles on the current debate over trans-substantive
procedure.-
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those tracks, would allow for the tailoring of procedural rules to
meet the needs of the particular case.120 Formality is not always
bad, but the reaction of those who have enjoyed court-annexed ar-
bitration indicates that there is often too much of it.
Discovery abuse, it should go without saying, is a problem that
goes well beyond cases suitable for mandatory arbitration. Further-
more, it is wrong to think that the horror stories of discovery abuse
come from the modest cases that are now eligible for court-
annexed arbitration. To the contrary, it appears that discovery
does not pose a substantial barrier to litigating these cases.12' This,
then, cannot help justify the present system of mandatory
arbitration.
Client alienation is another problem that the bar should be
addressing seriously. Perhaps the individual client with a small
monetary claim feels more alienated from lawyers and courts than
the general counsel of a large corporation. If, however, this point is
just a variant of the complaint about stultifying procedures and
too much formalism, then small and large litigants would probably
have similar reactions. In addition, smaller clients may feel equally
alienated if they discover that, for them, a trial in a courtroom
before a jury is more costly than it would be for General Motors or
Citicorp.
If court-annexed arbitration is actually improving the effi-
ciency of the federal courts, then some of the other objections
might be easier to dismiss. If efficiency means a reduction in the
quantity of judicial resources (that is, time and money) needed to
process each case, the evidence has not yet proven that proposi-
tion. 22 It is possible, of course, that arbitral hearings are improv-
ing the quality of dispositions, and that the fears of irrational ju-
ries, high-priced lawyers and crushing discovery are driving
settlements rather than arbitral awards. This would be an effi-
ciency gain of another sort-one that would predictably draw more
cases into the civil pipeline, rather than result in any overall case
reduction. If qualitative gains are the goal, which they surely
should be, then the question is from where are those gains coming?
The answer may be from the vastly expanded pool of "judges." If
so, this result has consequences for the more general debate about
120 Justice for All at 14-17 (cited in note 1).
121 One can infer that nothing, including discovery, is slowing down many types of cases
in the federal courts by looking at the low median times for disposition of cases by nature of
suit. See 1989 Annual Report at 216-17, Table C5A (cited in note 2).
1I See Hensler, 1990 U Chi Legal F at 410-13 (cited in note 11).
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the optimal size of the federal judiciary. The answer may be from
the reduced time to hearing, or the reduced investment in discov-
ery. Yet those gains may be possible for cases outside the arbitra-
tion track as well. As noted above, it is difficult to come to defini-
tive conclusions about the efficiency point, since much remains to
be studied. The answers, however, may suggest either that pro-
grams like court-annexed arbitration should become more firmly
entrenched and institutionalized, or that they should be regarded
merely as interim steps toward more comprehensive judicial
reform.
Finally, it is possible that court-annexed arbitration has been
embraced by those who believe that the Seventh Amendment has
outlived its usefulness. If litigants are content with an arbitral
hearing, then a great many civil jury cases have effectively been
eliminated from the system. The problem with this result lies in its
indirection. The Seventh Amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights,
gives a particular right to those involved in civil trials in U.S.
courts. There is nothing wrong with a national debate over the
continued usefulness of the Seventh Amendment, but it is disin-
genuous to chip away at its protections for the smallest and least
powerful litigants in the system. The jury right apparently still
means a great deal to Americans, even those who are not affiliated
with the trial lawyers. Granting, as I do, that the court-annexed
arbitration programs authorized by Congress in the 1988 legisla-
tion do not actually violate the Seventh Amendment, it remains
true that they substantially undercut the right to a jury trial by
coercively channelling litigants into a different system. My objec-
tion here would be completely answered by making the arbitration
system a voluntary one. Unfortunately, at its most basic level,
mandatory arbitration seems too much like a back-door repeal of
the Seventh Amendment for people with small claims.
CONCLUSION
The title of this Article announces that court-annexed arbitra-
tion is the wrong cure for whatever ails the federal courts. It is
wrong both because the problems arbitration address go well be-
yond the small subset of cases that enter the arbitration program,
and it is wrong because arbitration's own features need improve-
ment. If court-annexed arbitration becomes, in effect, the lowest
tier of federal civil court proceedings-the "sub districts" noted
above-then it will need to conform much more closely to the judi-
cial model. If, on the other hand, the values of informality and pri-
vacy take precedence, two choices are available. First, existing fed-
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eral court-annexed arbitration programs could be revised so that
the process becomes just another pretrial mechanism. As a pretrial
mechanism, federal judges legitimately could compel participation,
just as they presently compel compliance with discovery, Rule 16
and summary jury trials. In the alternative, court-annexed arbitra-
tion could follow the settlement model and become fully voluntary.
The existing pilot programs, while they have undeniably offered
useful insights into areas for judicial reform, do not offer a stable
long-term solution for the federal courts.
